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A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS THAT IS A
GOVERNMENT OF MEN AND WOMEN
Mark Tushnet*
I take Mark Killenbeck’s “provocative” article as an
occasion for some informal comments about what Korematsu and
Trump v. Hawaii tell us about the saying, “a government of laws,
not a government of men and women.”1 My basic thought is that
the “not” in the saying has to be replaced “but also.” And, in some
sense we have always had to have known that the saying was
wrong as stated.2 Whatever the laws are, they don’t make
themselves.3 Nor do they administer themselves, nor interpret
themselves. Men and women appear at the stages of enactment,
application, and adjudication. So, for example, we know that
legislators and high-level administrators can adopt policies that
say nothing whatsoever about race—regulations about stopping
cars to enforce safety regulations, for example—that police
officers on the ground can apply discriminatorily.4
Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii show us a government of
laws that is also a government of men and women can be infected
at each stage, in quite complex ways, by the racism of those men
and women even when they also acknowledge that the laws to
which they are subject (and that they are making and interpreting)
condemn racism. Legal actors simultaneously deny and affirm
that racism infects the law: deny it when they focus on the
“government of laws” part of the saying, affirm it when they focus
on the “government of men and women” part.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law emeritus, Harvard Law School.
1. See Benjamin Barr, A Government of Laws and Not of Men, WYLIBERTY (June 12,
2014), [https://perma.cc/PM7U-A75D].
2. See Daphna Renan, The President’s Two Bodies, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (2020)
(examining this proposition in detail with respect to the presidency).
3. Even accounts of law that treat it as an emergent phenomenon of human actions not
directed intentionally at law-creation still find its origins in human action, and natural law
accounts that attribute valid or good law to a non-human Creator treat that law as a normative
standard that is brought to ground by human action. See Randy E. Barnett, A Law Professor’s
Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 655, 656-59 (1997).
4. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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Here’s one version of the problems facing Roosevelt (and his
subordinates) and Trump (and his). It is deliberately desiccated,
drained of any of the real-world features, including emotions,
associated with their decisions. That’s going to be important in
my overall argument, so I urge readers to set aside for the moment
their understandable impatience with this version’s lack of
realism.
Both Roosevelt and Trump were making decisions under
uncertainty, as economists say.5 Saboteurs and terrorists posed
threats of uncertain degrees to United States national security.
Neither president could be certain about the identity of those
saboteurs or terrorists. The best they could do is assign
probabilities to categories (including of course a probability of
zero to some), and they could have varying degrees of certainty
about the probability assignments. Roosevelt (hypothetically)
might have assigned a probability of zero to the category
“Swedish-Americans” with a high degree of confidence. He
couldn’t reasonably be charged with making a bad decision if we
later discovered one or two Swedish-American saboteurs.
And “he”—the attribution to Roosevelt rather than others
will turn out to be important—might have assigned a high
probability to the category “Japanese-Americans” with some
confidence. And, again, he might not reasonably be charged with
making a bad decision if we later discovered no more than one or
two Japanese-American saboteurs.
The situation doesn’t change even if Roosevelt had evidence
at hand suggesting that rather few saboteurs were likely to be
found among that population. He would have to assign a
probability to the possibility that the evidence was incomplete or
misleading. After all, saboteurs who are effective do a good job
of doing what they can to stay out of categories where suspicion
reasonably attaches.6 You can do a formal analysis of decisionmaking under uncertainty about the risks associated with different
5. I note that the first steps of the argument that follows, and maybe more of them,
apply to decision-making about policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Loïc Berger
et al., Rational Policymaking During a Pandemic, 118 PNAS 1, 2 (2021),
[https://perma.cc/QZ6J-W9BG].
6. The television series The Americans provides a nice example with embedded Soviet
spies working at a travel agency. The Americans (FX television broadcast Jan. 30, 2013May 30, 2018).
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categories and uncertainty about the quality of the evidence, but
I think the point is obvious: Roosevelt was trying to “regulate”
the risk of sabotage, and by definition risks and evidence,
including evidence about the circumstances under which the risks
will be realized, are known only probabilistically.
The large literature on racial profiling and social welfare tells
us that barring decision-makers from using racial categories as a
predicate for risk-regulation doesn’t always enhance social
welfare. A great deal depends upon what the (real) probability is
that actions by people in the racial category will lead to the risk’s
realization (in Korematsu, sabotage), the costs that the realized
risk imposes, and the costs imposed by the regulation (removal
from homes and confinement in concentration camps, as well as
something like a “demoralization” cost to the entire population).
In an uncertain world, I doubt that anyone could be confident
about his or her own assessment of whether a specific form of
racial profiling was welfare enhancing.
As far as I can tell, there are only two ways to deal with all
this. You can rule out racial profiling entirely, acknowledging
that doing so will sometimes reduce social welfare, or you can
assign the decision about whether to allow racial profiling in the
situation at hand to someone else and accept as authoritative
whatever he or she decides.7 Whoever makes the decision is
going to have to come up with some probabilities about risks and
about the quality of the evidence at hand. When judges get the
assignment, as they do on constitutional questions in the United
States legal system, one piece of evidence they have is the
decision made by (in these cases) the President. The familiar
standards of review language describes the weight courts are to
give to that piece of evidence.
The foregoing offers the “government of laws” perspective
on the problems underlying Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii. It’s
full of words like “might” and “could.” A government of laws
could make the decisions without engaging in racial or religious
discrimination. But, as I noted at the outset, the government of
7. This is the enduring legacy of the legal process jurisprudential school, which, despite
some long-standing and valid critiques, nonetheless offers important insights into how to go
about thinking through both substantive and institutional questions about the law. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV.
953, 964 (1994).
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laws is also a government of men and women, and that’s where
problems arise.
As I indicated, we know that facially neutral laws can be
adopted for racially discriminatory reasons.8 Here racism appears
at the enactment level. We also know that facially neutral laws
not necessarily adopted for racially discriminatory reasons can be
administered in a racially discriminatory way.9 In these cases
racism appears at the enforcement stage. And, though courts are
unsurprisingly reluctant to acknowledge the fact, facially neutral
laws can be interpreted by judges in racially discriminatory
ways.10 Here racism appears at the adjudication and lawapplication stage. I turn to examining Korematsu and Trump v.
Hawaii using these categories.
How the policies of interning Japanese-Americans and
banning Muslim entry into the United States came into being
brings out the role of men and women in a government of laws.
As a matter of law, both policies were grounded in executive
orders issued under the President’s signature.
The actual president’s role in the two cases was different,
though. Roosevelt appears to have had no personal investment in
the internment decision. Whatever his subordinates came up with
was fine with him: curfew, interments, no internment, ending
internment, extending internment, or something else. In one
sense we might say that he looked at the issue from the
perspective of a government of laws: if the things that might be
true were true, the policies were justified, and he engaged in
deferential review, so to speak, of what his subordinates did. His
subordinates were racists, and that’s what generated the policy.
8. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
9. See, e.g., peremptory challenge decisions such as Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
82 (1986). Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886), where the discriminatory
enforcement led the Court to invalidate the underlying ordinance (perhaps inferring
discriminatory motivation at the enactment stage).
10. Clear examples are difficult to come by in the modern era at the United States
Supreme Court, but the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision reviewed in Patterson v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 607 (1935), applied a state procedural rule in a way that strongly
supported an inference that that court was interpreting the rule for the racist purpose of
ensuring that Powell’s conviction would be insulated from United States Supreme Court
review. See also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 356 (1964) (holding, in the
context of a civil rights demonstration, that the state supreme court had violated the due
process clause by interpreting a state statute too broadly).
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In contrast, Trump himself was the racist in Trump v. Hawaii; a
fact that the Supreme Court struggled with.11 The challenge to
the third executive order failed because the work Trump’s
subordinates did was enough to cleanse the Order of any
constitutional taint.
One disturbing possibility then presents itself. Perhaps the
Supreme Court’s unstated view is that intentional racial
discrimination at one part of the enactment process can be
cleansed by actions at another part: General DeWitt’s racism
eliminated by Roosevelt’s indifference, Trump’s racism
eliminated by the work of the Office of Legal Counsel.
Why though might the Court take this position? We might
want to think of two forms racism can take, personal and systemic
or institutional, and we could define systemic or institutional
racism in two ways. Personal racism is straightforward: someone
takes an action because he or she is motivated by racism.12
Systemic racism might occur when a significant number of actors
with influence over social outcomes are individually racist.13
This is a purely subjective account of systemic racism. An
alternative is to say that systemic racism occurs when material
and other social goods are distributed in such a way that a racial
(or religious) minority receives an unjustifiably low proportion of
them, without regard to the causal mechanisms producing that
distribution.14 Subjective motivations might play a role, but they
aren’t essential to the story. I would describe the alternative as
offering an objective account of systemic racism.

11. For my more detailed explanation for that assertion, see Mark Tushnet, Trump v.
Hawaii: “This President” and the National Security Constitution, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 119 (2018).
12. I think it’s not important for present purposes to define precisely what the
subjective state of mind is. It could be a desire to do something for the very purpose of
causing disadvantage to the Black community, or for the purpose of causing more
disadvantage to the Black community than to others; or a lack of interest in the question of
what the action’s impact on the Black community will be; or (what might be the same thing)
“selective indifference” to effects on the Black community. See Ian H. Lopez, Institutional
Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717,
1726 n.28 (2000) (quoting STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK
POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 4-5 (1967)).
13. See id. at 1799-1801 (considering “pick your friends” racism in grand jury
selection).
14. See Thomas Kleven, Systematic Classism, Systematic Racism: Are Social and
Racial Justice Achievable in the United States?, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 37, 37 (2009).
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With objective accounts, we can have a systemically racist
government of laws because individual motivation doesn’t
matter. I’ve suggested that by cleansing the policies in
Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii of the racist motivations of
General De Witt and President Trump, the Court vindicated the
idea that we have a government of laws but in a way that allows
critics to continue to fairly describe the policies as objectively
systemically racist.
At the same time though, we are a government of men and
women. In such a government, racism at the individual level will
inevitably occur. That’s clearest at the level of enforcement,
when a police officer stops a motorist in part because the driver
is Black. There’s no reason to think that it can’t occur at the level
of enactment or adjudication as well.15
Now, though, we have to worry about the possibility that we
have a systemically racist government in the first, subjective
sense. That occurs when lots and lots of decision-makers are
individually racist. And, in my view, that’s what we have in the
United States.
As it turns out, that’s also a view the Supreme Court once
came quite close to expressing openly (and that view, I believe,
lies near the surface of other Supreme Court opinions).
Washington v. Davis rejected statutory and constitutional
challenges to the District of Columbia’s use of a reading test for
its police officers.16 Job applicants who failed the test argued that
its use deprived them of equal protection because using the test
had a more substantial adverse effect on the class of Black
applicants than on the class of white applicants.17 The Court
rejected the argument, holding that disparate effects that didn’t
result from intentional (that is, subjective) racial discrimination
were insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.18
One reason Justice Byron White gave for this holding,
though, might have implications for our understanding of the
subjective version of systemic racism—that it occurs in a
15. The simplest version would be where a majority of a legislature or a supreme
court’s members were individually racist and acted on those views. For an extensive analysis
of this and other possibilities, see Fallon, supra note 7.
16. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976).
17. Id. at 232-33.
18. Id. at 245-46.
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government of men and women where racism is widespread.
Justice White wrote that a pure disparate impact test “would raise
serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of
tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black
than to the more affluent white.”19
There are two important and related moves here. The first
accurately notes that race is correlated with wealth. In a nation
where that’s true, a pure disparate impact test amounts to
characterizing the nation as systemically racist in the second,
objective sense. What aspect of a test makes subjective
motivation relevant though? This is where the second move can
be seen. Such a test will also “raise serious questions about . . . a
whole range of” policies when subjective, individual racism is
pervasive.20
We can see this concern at work in some reactions to the
Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. BLM begins by directing
attention to the implementation stage within the criminal justice
system and, in particular, to the way individual police officers
deal with Black citizens.21 These seem to be acts of intentional
discrimination. They are so pervasive, though, that BLM expands
its vision to encompass subjective, systemic racism (widespread
individual, intentional discrimination). It further expands its
vision to encompass the objective when it brings the already
existing challenges to mass incarceration into its purview.22 And
at some point in this process—and probably before the final
expansion—critics of BLM say, echoing Justice White, that the
movement raises doubts about a whole range of criminal justice
policies.
BLM seems onto something, of course, especially at the
implementation stage. Individual, intentional discrimination
there seems quite widespread. That would mean that the reasons

19. Id. at 248.
20. Id.
21. See About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, [https://perma.cc/MM38-59U2] (last visited
Mar. 5, 2021).
22. By this I mean that most accounts of mass incarceration don’t attribute it to
individual acts of racial discrimination.
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for refusing to accept a disparate impact test apply to an
intentional discrimination test as well.23
We can now understand why courts might try to develop the
doctrine that individual discriminatory acts are unconstitutional
in a way that accommodates Justice White’s concerns. And that,
I suggest, is what the “cleansing” approach does. Overstating, but
I think only a bit, if a court can tell the story about a challenged
policy in which some actor with influence on the account didn’t
have the prohibited intention, the action is constitutionally
permissible.
Reflect for a moment, though, on this. Justice White’s
concern has been criticized on the ground that it rests on the
concern that, properly interpreted, the Constitution requires more
justice than the United States can deliver.24 We are now at the
third stage of the “government of laws.” Judges—men and
women—interpret the law.
They know that individual,
intentional racial discrimination is pervasive, but they can’t
acknowledge that fact because it would be too destabilizing.
That’s why Korematsu was so disturbing to Chief Justice
Roberts in Trump v. Hawaii; it showed that individual,
intentional, racial discrimination could occur at the interpretation
stage. The problem, that is, wasn’t that General DeWitt was a
racist, though he was. The problem was that enough of the
Supreme Court’s Justices were racists to generate Korematsu as a
precedent.25 Repudiating Korematsu means either that all of the
Justices were racists or that for some reason you can’t cleanse the
opinion by locating some Justices who weren’t racist.
Once that possibility is raised, though, you—that is, a
Justice—need only a minimal level of self-awareness to begin to

23. I note that a similar analysis seems appropriate in discussing the suggestion that
the responses of the United States Capitol Police to the events of January 6, 2021, were
racially discriminatory in that the police wouldn’t have responded similarly to a BLM
demonstration that ended up seeking to invade the Capitol building.
24. Justice Brennan used the phrase “too much justice” in his dissent in McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . states that its
unwillingness . . . is based in part on the fear that recognition of McCleskey’s claim would
open the door to widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing. . . . Taken on
its face, such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.” (citations omitted)).
25. I put it this way rather than saying that “the Court” was racist because we’re dealing
with individual-level intentions. Professor Killenbeck provides direct evidence of some of
the Justices’ racism. See generally, 74 ARK. L. REV. __, __ (2021).
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worry about the possibility that as then, so now.26 Maybe, you
think nervously, what I’m doing now is affected by my own notyet-acknowledged racism or, only a bit less disturbing, by the
racism of the colleagues I work with every day.27 That thought
has to be pushed out of consciousness, of course. That’s where
all the doctrinal maneuvers in Trump v. Hawaii come in:
cleansing, focusing on the scope of presidential power over entry
into the United States, emphasizing that the policy’s targets were
non-citizens.
The thought lingers, though; put all the things the Court has
built into the doctrine, especially Justice White’s worries about
“too much justice,” and perhaps we can see the Court as a
participant in constructing systemic racism in its second variant,
where racist outcomes occur even though not enough people are
themselves intentionally racist.28 Or, even more troubling, we can
see the Justices as participants in constructing systemic racism in
the first, widespread intentional discrimination variant.29

26. Galatians 4:29 (Common English Bible) (“But just as it was then, so it is now also
. . . .”). I must note that not all of the Justices actually do have a minimal level of selfawareness.
27. For what it’s worth, I report my sense that Thurgood Marshall, an extraordinary
personality, managed to deal with this phenomenon in a completely mature way.
28. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
29. For my earlier presentation of reasons for this conclusion, see Tushnet, supra note
11, at 7-12.

